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The literature on pro-social behavior shows that older children are more generous than 
younger children; however, the level of individual generosity is heterogeneous even 
between children of the same age. This paper investigates whether a child’s popularity 
affects his/her generosity. Our participants – 231 children, six to twelve years old – decide 
how many of their four colored wristbands they want to share with another anonymous 
child. We manipulate the visibility of this decision: in treatment Public, the decisions are 
revealed to the entire class at the end of the game, whereas in treatment Private children’s 
decisions remain secret. In addition, we elicited each child’s network of friends using an 
innovative “seating map” mechanism. Our results reveal that more popular children are 
more generous in Public than Private decision environments, while less popular children 
behave similarly in both cases. Moreover, older children in Public display greater 
generosity than (i) older children in Private and (ii) younger children in either Public or 
Private. Finally, in Public, older and more popular children share more than less popular 
older children, and more than younger children regardless of popularity; whereas, in 
Private there is no effect of popularity on children of any age. Our findings point to another 
reason to adopt transparent decision making in teams and organizations: it may promote 
the generosity of some (perhaps especially popular leaders) without detrimentally 
impacting the pro-sociality of others.   
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I. Introduction 
 
A substantial literature in psychology suggests a strong correlation between popularity and 
generosity: popular people are usually also perceived to be pro-social1(e.g. Cillessen & 
Mayeux, 2004; LaFontana & Cillessen, 1999, 2002; Parkhurst & Hopmeyer, 1998; 
Prinstein & Cillessen, 2003; Rubin et al., 2006; Wright et al., 2012; Xie et al., 2002). This 
finding resonates with observations with non-human primates, which also view higher-
ranked individuals as generous with resources (de Waal & Suchak, 2010; Horner, Carter, 
Suchak, & de Waal, 2011). One explanation for this correlation could be that intrinsically 
generous people are more likely to become popular. Another possibility is that popular 
people, rather than having a greater preference for prosociality, are instead more likely to 
display generosity in public environments (perhaps due to signaling or reputation 
maintenance). To our knowledge, no previously discovered evidence has been able to 
distinguish these possibilities. Here we attempt to fill this gap by comparing the 
prosociality of popular (and less popular) people.   
 
We report experiments that examine the connection between popularity and prosociality 
(sharing decisions) among children aged six to twelve in both public and private 
environments. A key finding of this paper is that more popular children are more generous 
than less popular in public but not private environments. Moreover, we find older children 
to be more generous than younger in both public and private contexts; while popularity and 
age have a significant and positive interaction only in public. Additionally, in the Strengths 
and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997), which measures behaviors, emotions and 
relationships, we find popular children to have systematically lower scores (indicating 
fewer negative behaviors), suggesting that popularity may be tied to fundamental 
personality attributes. 
 
Our results cast substantial doubt on the possibility that innate generosity generates 
popularity. Rather, our findings are more in line with the view that popular children excel 																																																								
1As anecdotal evidence, some self-help websites indicate that one of the key steps in becoming popular is 
to be nice, helpful, and friendly to others, e.g., http://www.wikihow.com/Be-Popular. 
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at public image maintenance. Further, our results help to explain the observation that some 
people behave more generously in public2 (see, for example, Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; 
Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996; Lazear, Malmendier, & Weber, 2012). Likewise, they 
help to identify those people whose decisions are most influenced by public decision-
making. 
 
We conduct a framed field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004) with children aged 6 to 12 
in Italy. We measure prosociality using a dictator game variant, and then later elicit the 
child’s popularity (see Section II for the details regarding the way we do this). Further, we 
vary the visibility of decisions in the dictator game, allowing decisions to be made either 
in private (anonymous decisions) or public (decisions are known by all participants). As 
noted, doing this allows inference regarding whether popular people are innately more pro-
social than others, as suggested by the literature above, or rather whether their prosociality 
is mediated by context.  
 
The advantage to conducting this study in the school with children is twofold: First, we can 
exploit a natural social network rather than exogenously creating one in the laboratory. 
Second, we are able to capture arguably the most important network of friend in the child’s 
life: the reason is that between 6 and 12, children spend most of their day at school (from 
about 8.30 to 16.30 in our sample). For most children, their only close friends are those at 
school. For this reason, most studies on childhood peer relationships are conducted in 
classrooms (for a review, see Gifford-Smith & Brownell, 2003).  
 
Our research has many implications for public decision environments. For example, much 
charitable giving research focuses on designing incentives that can be applied to an entire 
donor base. An alternative is to conduct campaigns targeted specifically at those who are 
likely to respond positively to the initiative. Our findings suggest that it may be fruitful and 
potentially cost effective to conduct donation drives specifically targeted towards those 																																																								
2 See for example, Hoffman et al. (1996), where, in a double blind treatment, subjects were significantly 
more likely to give zero in a dictator game than in the treatment where experimenters were present; another 
example would be Andreoni & Petrie (2004), who showed that reduced confidentiality gives rise to greater 
generosity in fund-raising. 
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who are most popular. Another implication is that, since public officials are by definition 
popular (they are supported and elected by voters), and thus more likely to be sensitive to 
public decision environments, it may be valuable to ensure elected officials make their 
decisions in public. Further, our results help to explain why some people, but not all, 
become more generous when decisions are made in public.3 
 
Finally, our data offer yet another reason to ensure transparency of individual effort within 
teams. In particular, doing so may promote the cooperativeness of some without 
detrimentally impacting the pro-sociality of others. Moreover, if those who behave more 
pro-socially also hold positions on influence within the team or organization, this may have 
the additional positive impact of nudging others in this same direction. Doing so may 
improve a group’s so-called “social sensitivity” and consequently can improve its overall 
performance for the organization (Woolley et al, 2010).     
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section III details our hypotheses; 
Section IV describes the experimental design and procedures; Section V presents the 
results of our study; and Section VI discusses our findings and concludes.  
 
II. Related Literature 
Popularity typically refers to degree of likability and the level of support from the peers. 
For our purposes below, we will say that a person is more popular if more of her peers 
desire to be in her company. There are many factors closely associated with popularity, 
including physical appearance, personal charisma, specific skills or achievements that are 
more narrowly acknowledged, to more general societal appreciation (see, for example, 
Zwaan et al., 2013). Additionally, popularity is closely related to status, which refers to a 
hierarchy that is socially recognized: status can confer popularity (e.g., high achieving 
athletes gain popularity through excellence in sports performances; socialites obtain 
popularity through acclaimed family background). Popularity can also give rise to status 
																																																								
3 For example, in Dictator games, it is routinely found that almost all people are selfish in “double-blind” 
implementations of the game, and only some people become more generous when the game is played in a 
“single-blind” context. 
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(e.g., homecoming king/queen or elected president). Indeed, in some cases, scholars from 
sociology use status and popularity interchangeably (i.e., popularity is defined as a form of 
social status) (e.g., Cillessen & Lansu, 2011).  
 
A large literature investigates the economic consequences of popularity or status. Key 
findings are that those with higher status seize a greater share of the surplus (Ball & Eckel, 
2001) and enjoy wage premium later in life (Conti et al., 2013); and status seeking 
behaviors generally result in a less productive use of resources and lower welfare (Abbink 
et al., 2011; Bolle et al., 2010; Charness et al., 2013; Congleton, 1989; Fershtman & Weiss, 
1993; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003). At the same time, psychologists have shown 
that popularity impacts people’s childhood, adolescence and adulthood, in that being 
unpopular is usually associated with adverse behaviors, poor academic or work 
performance, and poor psychological health (for example, Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; 
Newcomb et al., 1993; Schwartz, 2000; Scott & Judge, 2009).  
 
As noted above, given the widely replicated result that popular people generally display 
prosociality, it is somewhat surprising that little evidence has been gathered on the innate 
prosociality of popular people. Prosociality is critical for humans to achieve and maintain 
cooperation in large groups of genetic strangers; likewise, it paves the way for large scale 
impersonal exchange, which forms the foundation of prosperous human societies. Indeed, 
human social interaction is largely shaped by pro-social preferences (Chen & Houser, 
2012; Fehr et al., 2008).  
 
Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) report data informing the innate prosociality of popular 
individuals. The authors elicited the social network of first year undergraduate students 
who also made decisions in a standard dictator game. Those decisions were made 
anonymously and privately. Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) report that more socially integrated 
people display greater generosity in this environment, pointing to the possibility that innate 
altruistic tendencies covary with popularity. Alternatively, the authors’ experiment design 
leaves open the possibility that the source of the increased generosity might be indirect 
reciprocity: more socially integrated individuals (i.e., those who are well-connected in the 
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network – he/she knows everybody and everybody knows him her) might be more generous 
because they believe they are more likely to benefit from the generosity of the other 
participants in the same session4.  
 
Our study differs from Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) in two important ways. First, the effect 
of indirect reciprocity is mitigated by design since children donate to anonymous children 
from an anonymous participating class of the same age. Consequently, more socially 
integrated individuals cannot expect to be asymetrically advantaged by others’ generosity, 
Second, our meausre of popularity is similar to, but distinct from, the notion of social 
integration. The reason is that the latter measure relies on bi-directional network links 
between individuals, while popularity does not. Loosely speaking, to be “sociall 
integrated” a person must like and be liked by others, while to be popular a person must 
only be liked. Consequently, it need not be the case that popular individuals are also 
socially integrated. 
 
It is worth noting that few economic studies have investigated the developmental roots of 
the relationships between popularity and pro-social behaviors. Studies of non-human 
primate prosociality often suggest dominance rank as a mediator of pro-social tendencies 
(e.g., De Waal & Suchak, 2010; Horner et al., 2011; Proctor et al., 2013). The reason is 
that, in comparison to those with low rank, high-ranked primates tend to be more pro-
social. Given the evolutionary connectedness between human and non-human primates, we 
may expect similar findings amongst humans, and, in particular, young children. Layous 
et al. (2012) suggests that pro-social behaviors boost peer acceptance in children aged 9 to 
11 years. LaFontana & Cillessen (2002) concluded that 4th to 8th graders indicate liked 
others as pro-social and disliked others as antisocial. Similarly, they associated perceived 
popularity with both pro-social and antisocial behavior.  
																																																								
4 In their experiment the recipients in the game are selected from the list of friends and in the experimental 
instructions this is made clear to participants. The authors write that, at the stage of network elicitation, 
participants were told that there was a chance that one of the listed friends would benefit later in the 
experiment (p. 251).  
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We contribute to the existing literature by shedding light on the extent to which 
popularity/status concern affects children’s pro-social behaviors in both public and private 
decision contexts.  
 
III. Hypotheses 
In this section, we describe our main hypotheses.  
H1: Public environments promote pro-social behavior among popular people to a 
greater extent than less popular people (Main Popularity Effect), while behavior in 
private decision contexts does not vary with popularity. 
 
According to social signaling, perception dictates people’s prosociality, in that people care 
about their social image and whether they are perceived as fair and pro-social, while their 
behavior is driven by other people’s knowledge about what they did (or did not do) 
(Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Charness, Rigotti, & Rustichini, 2003; Leimgruber et al., 
2012; Schram & Charness, 2012). People exhibit less prosociality if they can be unfair 
without appearing so to others (Dana et al., 2007; Kagel, 1996; Larson & Capra, 2009; 
Levitt & List, 2007; Schram & Charness, 2012; Shaw et al., 2014). Popularity is a product 
of peer perception, and it is a form of social image; thus, we hypothesize that popularity 
should have a positive effect on pro-social behavior only when decisions are public 
information, and have no influence at all if decisions are private. In addition, to build and 
maintain popularity (or social status), one need only appear nice, altruistic, and fair in 
public (as opposed to private) situations. Indeed, several studies report that people often 
engage in “impression management” (for example, Barclay & Willer, 2007; De Cremer & 
Sedikides, 2008; Milinski et al., 2002).  
 
H2: Older children display greater generosity than younger children in both public and 
private environments (Main Age Effect). 
 
It is well-established fact in the child development literature that as children get older, they 
become more generous (see, for example, Murnighan & Saxon, 1998; Zarbatany, 
Hartmann, & Gelfand, 1985). There are a several possible explanations. First, people 
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develop social preferences: they prefer sharing and fairness to selfish alternatives5. As 
children grow older, they develop an innate sense of caring about others and egalitarian 
preferences (Fehr et al., 2008). Second, older children also have a better understanding and 
ability to use theory-of-mind reasoning (Slaughter et. al, 2015), and are more likely to 
believe that their peers will perceive them negatively if they are shown to be selfish. This 
anticipated disapproval from peers further prevents them from behaving in a selfish manner 
(Houser et al. 2012). Therefore, we hypothesize that older children will behave more 
prosocially than younger children, regardless of social context.  
 
H3: In public environments, older and more popular children display greater generosity 
than: (i) less popular older children; and (ii) younger children regardless of popularity; 
in private environments there is no effect of popularity on generosity among children of 
any age (Age & Popularity Interaction Effect). 
  
Older children with more developed theory-of-mind reasoning are more likely to pay 
greater attention to others’ perception about them; therefore, those children may have 
added incentives to acquire or maintain popularity (Aloise-Young, 1993; Banerjee, 2002; 
Bennett & Yeeles, 1990). Since popularity is a public phenomenon, older children will 
behave more generously only in public, as opposed to private, settings. On the other hand, 
younger children with less developed theory-of-mind reasoning are less likely to pay 
special attention to social image, and therefore have less incentives to be more generous in 
public than private situations. For example, Shaw et al. (2014) suggest that as children 
reach age 8 or 9, they develop an understanding self-presentation; further, they begin to 
modify their behaviors to appear more favorably to others.  
 
 
 																																																								
5 16- to 19-month-old infants gaze longer when resources are distributed unequally between two recipients, 
and prefer fair over unfair people (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane et al., 
2012). In the preschool years, children allocate resources equally between recipients when possible (Damon, 
1977; Hook & Cook, 1979; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). Between the ages of 6 and 
8, children will sacrifice their own resources in an attempt to be fair (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & 
Olson, 2012). 
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IV. Experimental Design and Procedure 
Participants. The experimental sessions were conducted in March 2012. Our participants 
were 231 children (109 females6), six to 12 years old (M = 8.74 years, SD = 0.11 years). 
These children were enrolled in 12 classes across 5 schools in the district of Treviso (Italy). 
Each class was randomly assigned to one of two between-class treatments: Public (91 
children; 40 females; Age M = 9.14 years, SD = 1.50 years); or Private (140 children; 69 
females; Age M = 8.47 years, SD = 1.44 years)7.  
 
Procedures. Children participated in a Dictator Game8: each child received 4 colored 
rubber bands (i.e., Silly Bandz, www.sillybandz.com). The children then had to decide how 
many rubber bands to donate to another real, but anonymous, child from another 
participating, anonymous class of the same grade. Children made their decisions in private; 
one child at a time would step out of the classroom with his/her four bands and an empty 
envelope with his/her individually assigned ID written on it. Children were instructed that 
before returning to the room, they should put any bands they wanted to donate in the 
envelope, and hide any bands they decided to keep for themselves. Upon return to the 
classroom, they handed the envelope to the experimenter and were reminded not to reveal 
their decisions. At the end of the study, the envelopes with the bands were randomly and 
anonymously donated to other children from other participating classes (but only after 
those other children had completed their study; thus, each child was once a giver and once 
a receiver, but children were not aware that they would also be receivers).  
 																																																								
6 Data was missing on the gender of 16 observations (twelve for treatment Private and four for treatment 
Public). 
7 In the Appendix we report the distribution of participants across the different grades and schools. In one 
school children in the first grade from two classes (N=52), participated in a unique experimental session for 
logistic reasons. These children were all assigned to the private treatment. Despite both classes 
participating in the experiment during the same session, we ensured the children from the two classes were 
separated from each other and we stressed that the names on the seating map had to include only children 
from their own class. 
8 Before the dictator game, in both the public and private treatments, to become familiar with the decision 
situation, children were asked to imagine having four rubber bands. They were then asked to indicate how 
many bands they would like to share with another anonymous real child participating to the experiment in 
another class or school. We asked each the child to think about this situation in private, without 
communicating with any other children, and to fill out a report sheet with the number of bands that they 
want to share. The script in Appendix A.1 reproduces the verbal instructions that were read to the children. 
Data from the training stage are analyzed in Blake et al. (2014).  
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We used rubber bands as reward, because they are popular amongst children of the ages 
we study. Different colors, sizes and shapes make this prize suitable to all ages and genders. 
Previous experiments with children living in the same geographical area have demonstrated 
the use of rubber bands as effective incentive for children in primary schools (see, for 
example, Blake et al., 2014; Houser et al., 2012; Maggian & Villeval, 2013). In addition, 
because children may be more likely to donate damaged rubber bands or those with shapes 
or colors they do not prefer, all children were told that at the end of the experiment they 
could trade bands with their classmates or with the experimenter (who effectively acted as 
a bands bank). However, such exchanges were uncommon. Finally, note that while 
differences in the desirability of rubber bands might affect the overall level of sharing, this 
would be common across treatments and thus cannot impact our conclusions regarding the 
effect of popularity or age on generosity. 
 
Each classroom was randomly assigned to either the private or public treatment, and this 
assignment was held constant throughout the experiment9. In the public treatment, children 
were informed at the beginning of each game that at the end of each game all children’s 
names and their individual decisions (i.e., bands donated in the Dictator Game) would be 
written on the blackboard for every child to see. However, in the private treatment, 
children’s decisions were not revealed and the experimenter carefully explained this to the 
children (see Appendix for more details).  To keep these two treatments as similar as 
possible, we listed the children’s names on the blackboard in both treatments; however, in 
the Private Treatment, we did not report the children’s decisions, but only whether they 
participated in the activity.  
 
At the end of the Dictator Game, without warning, we asked the children to fill out a sheet 
of paper depicting a table and 5 chairs (that we called the “Seating Map”)10. Each child 																																																								
9 The entire experiment was conducted over 2 weeks. In this paper, we only consider data from the sessions 
conducted in week 1. 
10 The seating map used is reproduced in Figure A1.2 in the Appendix. When eliciting the network in the 
Public and Private treatments, one difference is the fact that children in treatment Public were informed 
about the choices of their classmates. If there is a treatment effect on network elicitation (say, for example, 
in Public, children’s names are associated with how many rubber bands they donate, then the more 
generous and popular kids might get more votes as Friend 1 and/or Friend 2), we should expect differences 
in vote distributions. However, as can be seen from Figure A2.1 to Figure A2.5 in the Appendix, we find 
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was required to write his/her name on the chair on the head of the table and (up to) five 
other names of other children in the class that s/he would like to have seated close to 
him/her (from closer to farther). We informed the children that the names they reported 
would be kept confidential and that neither the parents nor the teachers or other friends 
would know which names they wrote. Children received an additional rubber band for their 
collaboration.  
 
Using the names that the children reported, we created an index of popularity to use in our 
analysis. Note that, in each grade, the children had been in the same class for at least seven 
months, from September 2011 to March 2012 (i.e., since the beginning of the school term, 
which in Italy starts the first week of September). We consider this to be a sufficient time 
period for them to have established networks. 
 
Approximately one week before the experiment, we distributed to the children’s parents 
(or legal guardians) a flyer with a description of our study (we call this activity) and asked 
them to sign a consent form in which they agreed that their child would participate in the 
study. In addition, we asked parents to answer an anonymous questionnaire using the same 
ID given to the child during the experiment. In this questionnaire, we asked information 
about: i) the family (e.g., country of origin, marital status and education of the parents; 
number of children in the family and their age, etc.); ii) the child’s extracurricular activities 
(e.g., sports and hobbies, group versus individual activities, use of TV and PC, whether the 
child had a cellular phone, the amount of weakly allowance (if any), etc.). We also 
administered the strengths and difficulties questionnaire (SDQ), a questionnaire validated 
by Goodman (Goodman, 1997), which is used to elicit information about the child’s 
emotional symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity/inattention, and peer relationship 
problems. While parents could refuse to answer all or part of this questionnaire, their child 
could participate only if his/her parents signed the consent form.  
 
																																																								
no evidence that the order in which the experiment was conducted impacted the distribution of votes for the 
most popular children (upper quartile of the popularity distribution) across treatments (K-S test, p > 0.50 
for all cases). 
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V. Results 
The Dictator Game  
Overview of the sharing decisions On average, children shared more in Public, around 
1.46 rubber bands out of 4, while they only shared about 1.19 rubber bands in Private. 
Table 1 below shows the percentage of children sharing 0 to 4 rubber bands in both the 
Public and Private treatments. In Public, the mode is to be fair and share 2, while in Private, 
the mode changes to be selfish and share 0. 
Table 1. Sharing Decisions Across Treatments 
 % of Children In Each Category 
Number of Rubber bands Shared Public Private 
0 18/91 (19%) 49/140 (35%) 
1 26/91 (29%) 37/140 (26%) 
2 38/91 (42%) 41/140 (29%) 
3 5/91 (5%) 4/140 (3%) 
4 4/91 (4%) 9/140 (6%) 
Average Bands Shared 1.46 1.19 
 
Popularity Elicitation Protocol Using the data collected from the “Seating Map11”, we 
constructed a popularity index for each kid 𝑖 in his/her class12. We first counted the number 
of children in one class who indicated a particular child in their “Seating Map”. Then we 
created a popularity count following the rule of Borda Counts. Each child named on the 
“Seating Map” received a vote that translated into points. The votes were counted by giving 
each candidate a number of points equal to the number of candidates (denoted by 𝑛) ranked 																																																								
11 Our measure of popularity captures the so called “sociometric popularity”, which refers to how much a 
child is liked or disliked by peers and it is usually assessed via peer nomination. As noted by Slaughter et 
al., 2015, recently, a theoretical and empirical distinction has emerged between sociometric popularity and 
perceived popularity where, this last concept refers to the extent to which peers or other observers consider 
a child to have high status within the peer group and it is usually assessed via peer or teacher reports about 
which children are “popular” or, on the other side of the coin, which children are “rejected.” This 
distinction is important in light of the different behavior profiles of sociometrically popular and perceived 
popular children, with the former tending to have strong interpersonal and communication skills, to be 
prosocial and cooperative, and to be low on aggression while perceived popular children also tend to be 
communicative and prosocial, but at the same time, they often engage in relational aggression which they 
may use strategically to manipulate others in order to gain or maintain their position in the social group. 
See Slaughter et al., (2015) for a more detailed discussion on this.  
12 In the instructions, the children were told to write down (up to) five names of other children in the SAME 
class; therefore, the popularity measured here is based on class level. See the Script used reproduced in the 
Appendix A.1. 
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lower than them, such that a candidate receives n – 1 points for a first preference; n – 2 for 
a second; …; and n – 5 for a fifth preference (since we only elicit at the maximum five 
names/preferences). Note that the number of candidates 𝑛 is the total number of kids in a 
class, including those who did not participate in the experiment but still appear in the 
“Seating Map” names. 
 
Each child in a class was then ranked according to popularity count in increasing order. 
We then created the popularity index to reflect ranking outcomes. Popularity is ranked in 
ascending order; thus, the lower the popularity index, the more popular the child in his/her 
class. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for popularity index 
Treatment Sharing Decision Popularity Index Obs 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Max Class Size  
PUBLIC 1.46 1.01 9.69 5.66 23 91 
PRIVATE 1.19 1.14 9.19 5.21 20 140 
Total     231 
 
Table 2 above presents the summary statistics of popularity index across treatment. The 
distribution of popularity index among Public and Private treatments is nearly identical 
(p=0.20)13. The “Max” statistic shows the maximum number of children who participated 
in the experiment among all classes included in each treatment.  
 
Popularity effect on Sharing in Public vs. Private treatment 
We begin by aggregating the sharing decisions data. Specifically, we define a new dummy 
variable 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, which equals 1 if the number of rubber bands shared is greater than or 
equal to 2 and equals 0 otherwise. Therefore, the higher the value of 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, the higher 
the probability to share and the greater the level of generosity. 
 
We used a binary specification with 2 as the cutoff for two reasons. First, doing so leads to 
a roughly equal split in our sample in both the public and private treatments. For example, 																																																								
13 All p-values reported in this paper are based on two-sided tests. 
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in Public 51% of our participants shared two or more silly-bands, while 49% shared fewer 
than two. Second, cell sizes are highly unequal in our data. For example, in both treatments 
only 9% of our observations are in the top two cells (see Table 1). Consequently, 
aggregation is unavoidable when performing our analysis, and the procedure we adopted 
seems reasonable. Alternative specifications, such as using the total amount of rubber 
bands shared as the outcome variable, yield qualitatively identical results.  
 
Figure 1 and 2 below provide initial evidence for our first hypothesis: Popularity promotes 
pro-social behavior to a greater extent when decisions are public than when they are 
private. If this hypothesis is true, we should expect more popular children to behave more 
generously in Public than in Private while less popular children should share in the same 
way across Public and Private environments. 
 
Figure 1 details sharing by kids with popularity indices below median (the lower the 
popularity index, the more popular is the child). In particular, it shows the rate of sharing 
in Public and Private by popularity. The x-axis reports decreasing levels of popularity (with 
the highest level of popularity on the left), while the y-axis reports the proportion of 
children sharing two or more silly-bands. 
 One observes that the most popular children (Popularity index=1) share more in Public (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔*+,-./ = .60)  than in Private (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔*5.6789 = .22), although the difference is 
not statistically significant (p=.18)14 due to the low number of observations (𝑁*5.6789 = 9, 𝑁*+,-./ = 5). Across groups, one observes that the children whose popularity index lies 
within top 25th percentile of the popularity distribution share about 56% of the time in the 
Public treatment, and only 28% of the time in the Private treatment (p=.03).  Next, we find 
that children whose popularity index is within top 33rd percentile of the distribution share 
about 54% of the time in Public and 29% of the time in Private (p=.04). Last, children 
whose popularity is above median share 38% of the time in Public and 51% in Private 
(p=.20).  
 																																																								
14 All reported p values were from Mann-Whitney two-sided tests under the null hypotheses 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔*5.6789 = 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔*+,-./. 
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In sum, as popularity falls (from the most popular, to the top 25%, top 33% and finally top 
50% of the popularity distribution) we observe that children behave more similarly 
between the Public and Private environments.  
 
Figure 1. Sharing in Public vs. Private by popularity – Most Popular kids (i.e. children 
whose popularity index lies below the median of the popularity distribution) 
 
In contrast, Figure 2 shows the sharing in Private and Public by kids whose popularity is 
above the median. The x-axis reports the level of popularity in increasing order from left 
to right. The y-axis reports the fraction of children sharing two or more silly-bands. 
 
Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that, irrespective of the subset considered, children who are 
less popular than the median display about the same level of sharing in Public and Private 
(in all cases p>	0.1897). 
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Note: Error bars indicate mean ± s.e.m. Popularity is ranked in ascending order. The lower the popularity index, the more popular the
child in his/her class.
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Figure 2. Sharing in Public vs. Private by popularity – Least popular kids (i.e. children 
whose popularity index lies above the median of the popularity distribution) 	 
Figure 3 lends support to our second hypothesis: older children display greater generosity 
than younger children in both Public and Private. Here, we define “young” children from 
grade 1 to 2 and “old” those from grade 3 to 5 (following, e.g., Shaw et al., 2014, Houser 
et al., 2012)15. Older children share about 66% of the time on average, while younger 
children share only 23% of the time. Further, the fraction of children sharing is significantly 
greater for older children (in Public or Private) than younger ones in both Public and Private 
(p < .01 for all four pair-wise comparisons).  
 
 
 
																																																								15	Alternative specifications (e.g., median split, median = 8 years old) yield similar results. Note that in the 
regression analysis we use actual age in years as independent variable.	
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Figure 3. Old vs. Young Children Sharing 
 
Figure 4 below offers initial evidence in support of our third hypothesis: 1) In the Public 
treatment older and more popular children share more than: (i) less popular older 
children; and (ii) younger children regardless of popularity; 2) In the  Private treatment: 
there is no effect of popularity for children of any age. To see i),  note that older and more 
popular children share 87% of the time in Public, while their less popular but same-aged 
counterparts share (an insignificantly different) 71% of the time, where most popular 
children are those whose popularity index lies in the top 25% of the distribution. The 
younger and more popular children do not share at all, and the younger and less popular 
share only about 14% of the time (where less popular indicates children whose popularity 
index lies within the bottom 25% of the distribution), both of which are significantly lower 
than the likelihood of sharing by the older and more popular children (p<.01).  Next, with 
respect to 2), note that, in Private, young children with different popularity behave 
statistically similarly, as do older children with different popularity (p=.27 and p=.56, 
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n=31
0
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Note: Error bars indicate mean ± s.e.m. Young: children grades 1 and 2; Old: children grade 3 to 5.
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respectively). Similar patterns hold for other popularity groups such as those with 
popularity indices below the 33rd percentile.  
 
Figure 4: Age and Popularity Effect On Average Sharing 
                           
Next, we provide further support for our hypotheses by reporting Probit estimates of the 
following model:  
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔. = 𝛽? + 𝛽A ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐                                                                                          (1) 
                 +𝛽H ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦. + 𝛽M ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒. + 𝛽O ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽Q ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙.                  (2) 
                 +𝛽R ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦. + 𝛽S ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒. + 𝛽T ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒    (3)                                                                           
                +𝛽A? ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦. ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒. + 𝛽AA ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦. ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒. + 𝜀.         (4)               
Where, in all models, the dependent variable is the dummy 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔. = 1 if number of 
rubber bands shared ≥ 2; 0 otherwise. The independent variables include the dummy 
variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 identifying the treatment (=1, if it is Public Treatment, and 0 otherwise); 
the variable accounting for 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦.(=  −	Popularity index for child 𝑖, for which the 
higher the value, the more popular child 𝑖 is); the	𝐴𝑔𝑒.  (= Age of child 𝑖 in years); the 
gender captured by the dummy variable	𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒.(= 1 if child 𝑖 is male, 0 otherwise). We also 
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include the variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙.  indicating the Prosociality score obtained in the SDQ16 
filled by the parents. This variable provides some measurement of the child’s innate 
prosociality which potentially can also account for the sharing likelihood.  
 
Results of the estimations are reported in Table 2. Model (1) only includes the treatment 
dummy, which is not significantly different than the Private treatment (p=.41), suggesting 
that on aggregate kids behave similarly in both Public and Private environments. 
 
In Model (2), we also include as independent variables popularity, age and gender. As 
previously evidenced in Figure 4, we find that age has a significant and positive effect on 
sharing probabilities: a child one year older is 17% more likely to share (everything else 
equal). This result brings further evidence consistent with hypotheses H2. We can see that 
popularity, on its own, does not have an effect on overall sharing decisions. Being a male 
has a negative impact on sharing, as males on average are less likely to be generous than 
females, although the effect is not statistically significant. Lastly, those with higher pro-
social tendencies display a higher willingness to share, even if the coefficient does not 
achieve significance. 
 
In Model (3) we include some interactions of the treatment dummy Public with i) 
Popularity, ii) Age and ii) Gender. We notice that popularity has a significant and positive 
effect on the sharing probability in Public (p=.05) while not in Private (p=.49), which 
suggests that more popular kids are more likely to share in Public. Nonetheless, they are 
no more generous than in Private. Less popular kids behave more similarly between Public 
and Private. Indeed, children ranked first (in terms of popularity) are 20% more likely to 
share than children ranked eleventh in Public treatment, while in Private treatment children 
ranked first (in terms of popularity) are equally likely to share than children ranked 
eleventh. This result provides further support for our hypotheses H1. Additionally, we find 
that age has a significant and positive impact on both Public and Private treatments (p<.01 
in both cases). Finally, pro-social tendencies play a significant and positive role in sharing 																																																								
16 The SDQ questionnaire translated in different languages, as well as the scoring rules for each subscale, 
can be found at this website: http://www.sdqinfo.com. 
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decisions with a one-point increase in pro-social measurement bringing about 4% increases 
in sharing probabilities.  
 
In Model (4), we replicate the same estimation of Model (3) but we add the triple 
interaction term: Public x Popularity x Age to discuss the interaction effects of popularity 
and age on sharing probabilities. We find that age and popularity together have a significant 
and positive impact on sharing in Public (p<.01), but do not have an effect in the Private 
treatment (p=.61). This suggests that the more popular and older kids (recall that the more 
popular the child is, the lower the popularity index) are more likely to share in Public, 
however, they are no more likely to do so in Private. This result further supports our 
hypotheses H3. 
Table 2. Probit Regression Results  
 Sharing (=1 if number of rubber bands shared ≥2) 
Variables Marginal Effects 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Public .13 (.16) 
.05 
(.11) 
-.90*** 
(.13) 
-.99*** 
(.00) 
Popularity  -.0005 (.007) 
-.006 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.07) 
Public×Popularity   .02* (.01) -.14 (.10) 
Age  .17*** (.04) 
.12*** 
(.03) 
.15* 
(.09) 
Public×Age   .19*** (.07) .39*** (.14) 
Popularity×Age    .004 (.008) 
Public×Popularity× Age    .02* (.01) 
Male  -.08 (.08) 
-.13 
(.09) 
 -.13 
(.10) 
Public×Male   .11 (.16) .16 (.17) 
Prosocial  .04 (.02) 
.04* 
(.03) 
.04* 
(.03) 
N 231 182 182 182 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.19 0.23 0.24 
Note: This table reports marginal effects of the respective independent variables on the 
probability of sharing two or more silly-bands. The marginal effects represent the change in the 
probability of being a sharing two or more silly-bands for a one unit change in the independent 
variables. All marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean.  
Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Errors are clustered at group level. ***,**,* indicate 
significance level at p=.01,.05, .10, respectively. N decreases in regression 2, 3 and 4 due to 
some missing data on variable age, male and prosocial.  
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Further Analysis of the Questionnaire Results 
In order to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of most (upper quartile) and 
least (lower quartile) popular children, we use the information collected from the parents 
in the questionnaire to detect the existence of systematic difference between children who 
belong to the upper or lower quartile of the popularity distribution. Interestingly, the two 
groups are not different when looking at the observable characteristics of the households 
(i.e. education level and job of the parents, marital status, number of siblings, time spent 
watching television or in front of the computer). With one only exception: the most popular 
children are more likely to attend group activities than the least popular ones (76% versus 
41%, Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, z=3.461, p=0.006 two-
sided). 
 
The two groups of children seem to differ systematically when we look at the behaviors as 
reported by the parents. The parents of the most popular boys report worse school 
performance of their children compared to what reported by the parents of the least popular 
ones17 (Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, z=2.018, p=0.044 two-
sided), a more detailed discussion can be found in the Appendix A.4. 
 
Finally, when looking at the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997), 
we find that the most popular children have a lower score (implying fewer behavioral or 
emotional problems) in all subscales except for the pro-social one, suggesting that 
popularity is related to a psychological characteristics.18 
 
 
 																																																								
17 The parents are asked to rate the school performance of their child compared to the other in the class 
according to the following scale: 1=well above the average; 2= above the average; 3= average; 4=below the 
average; 5=well below the average. 
18 When considering the total score, as well as the scores of the sub-scales of the SDQ we only find a 
significant association between the sharing behavior of children and the subscale capturing reported 
emotional problems. We find that parents of children who share two or more sillibands report their children 
to have significantly more emotional difficulties compared to the reported by parents of children sharing 
fewer than 2 rubber bands. Other subscales, as well as the total scale, do not display any significant 
association with the average amount of rubber bands donated, the probability of sharing 2 or more rubber 
bands, as well as the probability of not sharing anything. 
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Table 3. Score of the Most and Least Popular children in the Strengths and Difficulties 
Questionnaire answered by parents, standard deviation in parenthesis.  
 
 Most popular kids 
(upper quartile) 
Least popular kids 
(lower quartile) 
Two-sample 
Wilcoxon- Mann-
Whitney test 
Emotional Symptoms Scale 1.60 
(1.67) 
2.52 
(2.10) 
z=2.169 
p=0.030 
Conduct Problem Scale 1.26 
(1.13) 
1.85 
(1.21) 
z=0.244 
p=0.015 
Hyperactivity Scale 2.56 
(1.80) 
3.80 
(2.21) 
z= 2.813 
p=0.005 
Peer Problem Scale 0.98 
(1.19) 
2.02 
(1.99) 
z= 2.975 
p=0.003 
Pro-social Scale 7.88 
(1.85) 
7.91 
(1.86) 
z=0.024 
p=0.981 
SDQ total (0-40)19 6.23 
(3.86) 
9.88 
(5.16) 
z= 3.525 
p=0.000 
Note: As evidenced by (Goodman, 1997) the score from the prosocial scale is not incorporated in the total 
difficulties score since the absence of prosocial behaviors is conceptually different from the presence of 
psychological difficulties. Note that, for all subscales, lower score indicates lower problems. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper explores relationships among popularity and pro-social behaviors in children. 
Our results show that more popular children display greater prosociality in public than in 
private settings, while the behavior of less popular children does not vary across these 
contexts. Further, age has a positive effect on pro-social behaviors, with older children 
sharing more. We also find positive interaction effects of popularity and age on 
prosociality, but only in public environments: older and more popular children are most 
responsive to a change in decision-making context. 
 
Our findings have several important implications. First, although popular people are often 
regarded as more pro-social, our results demonstrate that popular people are not 
intrinsically more pro-social. Instead, they act more generously in public, while they are 
less likely to do so in private. Therefore, inferences based on popular people’s public 
behaviors may result in misplaced trust. Second, our findings offer approaches to promote 
charitable giving. Since popular people are more likely to act prosocially in public 
environments, it may be efficient to tailor donation campaigns so that they influence the 																																																								
19 All subscales except the scale for prosociality. 
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decisions of the popular. Finally, our results offer further reasons for transparency in public 
decision-making, as the relevant decision-makers in these contexts are typically popular.  
 
Our results also have direct implications for the design of team production environments 
within organizations. A recent article by Woolley et al. (2010) reports data showing that 
team performance is higher when the team’s “social-sensitivity” is higher, and in particular 
when the number of female members of the team is larger. Our data suggest that another 
way to promote social-sensitivity is to ensure transparency of individual effort within the 
team environment. Making effort public promotes the pro-sociality of some without 
reducing that of others. Moreover, if those who behave more pro-socially are also in 
positions of influence within the organization, then this may nudge others in that same 
direction. The overall benefit in this case to social-sensitivity could be substantial, and lead 
to corresponding increases in overall team performance within the organization.  
 
An important limitation of our study is that it focuses on the behaviors of children. The 
advantage to doing so is that their social network is, in relation to adults, much more clearly 
defined (their classmates). Nevertheless, we drew inferences from our data to adult 
behaviors, though it would of course be valuable to conduct the studies with adult 
populations necessary to confirm these inferences.  
 
We find that popular children are more generous in public than private, but that this is not 
the case for less popular children. We did not set out to establish a causal link between 
popularity and prosociality, and doing so requires analyses far beyond the intended scope 
of this paper20. Nonetheless, our results cast doubt on the possibility that innate generosity 
causes people to become popular. Rather, our results suggest that more popular people are 
more likely to excel at image maintenance.  
 
We found it interesting that popular children generally had lower scores (implying fewer 
behavioral and problems) in the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire, (Goodman, 																																																								
20 Ideally, one would randomly assign popularity within friendship networks. This might be possible in 
controlled environments with artificially constructed social networks. 
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1997), suggesting that popularity is tied to fundamental personality characteristics. It may 
be the case that people better at presenting themselves publicly, or perhaps those more 
sensitive to social pressure, are more likely to become popular. It would be especially 
profitable for future research to investigate this possibility. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1. Experimental Procedures and Instruction. 
Our experimental sessions have been conducted in Italian public primary schools. Children 
attend the primary school from 6 to 11 and they are normally divided in 5 grades, grouped 
in class of approximately 15-25 children. The teacher was present for the whole duration 
of the experimental session but we asked him/her not to intervene.  
In each class, the experimental instructions were explained verbally to the children 
following the script reproduced below. Since the task is trivial but can be difficult to 
understand for some young children we repeated more than once the instructions and we 
allowed each child to ask questions about the rules of the game (but not the purpose).  
 
a. Dictator Game 
Before the dictator game, both in public and private treatment, in order to get familiar with 
the decision situation, children were asked to imagine having four rubber bands and to 
indicate how many bands they would you like to share with another anonymous real child 
participating to the experiment in another class or school. We ask each the child to think 
about this situation in private and not to communicate with other children and then fill a 
report sheet with the number of bands that they want to share. Once this training stage was 
completed, children made a real decision. Children in public treatment were informed that 
at the end of the activity their name and choice would have been written at the blackboard.  
For children in the private treatment only the name but not their choice was written. In each 
class the experiment has been conducted following the script below. 
 
Script: Dictator Game. 
Once in the class, the experimenter collects the consent form signed by the parents and 
writes on the blackboard the names of the children who participate. After the training stage 
was completed, the Dictator Game was introduced following the script below. 
 
Script: Dictator Game 
Ok, now you have another decision to make. This time all your decisions now will have 
real consequences. Let me explain better. This time we will give you 4 rubber bands. Now 
, each of you can decide if he wants to share his rubber bands 4 with another boy or girl 
from another class who will participate in the game later. Now, each of you will leave the 
class, you will receive 4 rubber bands and in secret have to decide if he wants to share his 
bracelets with this person and if he decides to divide must put the rubber bands who decides 
to give the envelope. Each of you in fact have a bag like this.[The assistant shows the 
envelope to children]. So if you want give any rubber bands to another child, just put it in 
the envelope. Put the rubber bands that you want to keep for you in your pocket and do not 
let them see by your classmates until the end of the activity. Once you have taken your 
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decision, when entering the class, you have to leave the envelop to the assistant. So, while 
you wait for your number to be called we ask you to think carefully about what you want 
to do in the situation described, in order to be fast in the decision. 
[Repeat to each child what to do and to hide the bracelets that they want to keep outside 
the envelope. When the children come back in to the class afer the decision is take, they 
leave the envelope to the assistant. The envelopes will then be distributed to the children 
of a following experimental session (at the end of the planned activity)]. 
 
TREATMENT: Public vs. Private 
[Public: say the following sentence:] After you have made your choice, we will open the 
envelopes in front of everyone and write on the board what has chosen each one of you so 
that everyone can see what you have decided. 
[Private: say the following sentence:] Your choice will remain anonymous. 
 
 
b. Seating Map: Eliciting the network of friends and their popularity 
After the dictator game, we ask children to fill a sheet of paper (see Figure A1.1) where a 
table and 5 chairs are depicted. Each child has to write his/her name on the chair on the 
head of the table and (up to) five other names of other children in the class that s/he would 
like to have seated close to him/her (from the closer to the farther). We inform children 
that the names they report will be kept confidential and neither the parents nor the teachers 
or other friends will know what they write. Children receive a rubber band for their 
collaboration. We can use the names reported to map child’s network of friends and create 
an index of popularity that we will use in our analysis.  
 
Figure A1.1. Seating Map:  Report Sheet for elicitation of network of friends and their 
popularity 
 
If you were sitting at the head of a table with 5 friends, who would you place where? Please indicate the 
name and surname of your friends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 _______      _______      _______      _______      _______       
   Friend 1       Friend 2      Friend 3       Friend 4       Friend 5   
 
 
 
 
You 
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A.2. Additional Tables 
 
Table A.2.1 Participants, Treatment and Grades. 
 Private Public Total 
Grade 1 52 16 68 
Grade 2 36 15 51 
Grade 3 15 17 32 
Grade 4 18 20 38 
Grade 5 19 23 42 
Total 140 91 231 
 
Table A.2.2 Participants, Treatment and Schools. 
 Private Public Total 
School 1 (Altivole) 37 17 54 
School 2 (Campagna) 0 31 31 
School 3 (Caselle) 0 20 20 
School 4 (Merlengo) 52 23 75 
School 4 (Ponzano) 51 0 51 
Total 140 91 231 
 
 
 
Table A.2.1 Non-Parametric Tests - Effect of Popularity and Age on Average Donation 
																																																								
21 We here performed the Mann Whitney test.. 
 Public Private Public vs Private21 
p-value 
THE Most Popular Children 
(Popularity Index =1) 
1.6 (.75) 
N=5 
0.78 (.28) 
N=9 
0.36 
Old Children 1.88 (.11) 
N=60 
1.62 (.13) 
N=52 
0.06* 
Young Children 0.65 (.15) 
N=31 
.94 (.12) 
N=88 
0.35 
Most Popular Children 
(Upper Quartile) 
1.48 (.23) 
N=23 
1.03 (.18) 
N=35 
0.08* 
OLD (in grade 3-5)  2.13 (.19) 
N=15 
1.62 (.27) 
N=13 
0.06* 
YOUNG (in grade 1-2)  .25 (.16) 
N=8 
.68 (.21) 
N=22 
0.26 
Least Popular Children 
(Lower Quartile) 
1.54 (.22) 
N=26 
1.22 (.17) 
N=41 
0.26 
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      Standard Error reported in the parenthesis, * indicates 10% significance level, two-sided test. 
 
A.3. Additional Statistical Tests 
As described in the main text, when eliciting the network in Public and Private treatment a 
difference is given by the fact that children in treatment Public are informed about the 
choice of their classmates. In order to exclude major effects related to this procedure, in 
the Figure A2.1 below we report the Kernel Density Estimate of the Popularity Index across 
treatments: if the public treatment would have had an effect on the elicitation of the network 
of the friend we should observe a difference in the way the popularity index is distributed. 
However, both from the Figure and by the K-S test we can exclude this hypothesis, (K-S 
test, p>0.99) across treatments. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3.1: Kernel Density Estimate of the Friends 1 Nomination For Most Popular 
Children By Treatment 
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Figure A.2.2: Kernel Density Estimate of the Friends 2 Nomination For Most Popular 
Children By Treatment 
 
Figure A.2.3: Kernel Density Estimate of the Friends 3 Nomination For Most Popular 
Children By Treatment 
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Figure A.2.4: Kernel Density Estimate of the Friends 4 Nomination For Most Popular 
Children By Treatment 
 
Figure A.2.5: Kernel Density Estimate of the Friends 5 Nomination For Most Popular 
Children By Treatment 
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A.4. Additional Statistical Tests 
 
In Table A.4.1 we report results from a set of non-parametric tests aimed at investigating 
systematic differences between most and least popular children using the information 
collected from the questionnaire answered by the parents. 
It can be noted how most and least popular children do not seem to differ with respect 
any of the observable characteristics of the household. 
 
 
Table A.4.1. Differences between most and least popular children, standard deviation in 
parenthesis. 
 
 Most popular kids 
 (upper quartile) 
Least popular kids  
(lower quartile) 
Two-sample Wilcoxon  
rank-sum (Mann- 
Whitney) test 
Country of birth 
1=if born in Italy, 0 otherwise. 
0.96 
(.20) 
0.92 
(.28) 
z=0.787 
p=0.432 
Single child 
1= if single child, 0 otherwise 
0.04 
(.21) 
0.02 
(.14) 
z=0.641 
p=0.523 
Respondent of the 
questionnaire 
1=mother, 2=father, 3=other 
1.17 
(.53) 
 
1.26 
(.38) 
z=0.746 
p=0.456 
Fisher’s exact=0.640 
Martial status of the 
respondent 
1=single, 2=married (or 
equivalent), 3=divorced, 
4=widowed 
2.02 
(.15) 
1.98 
(.32) 
z=	0.812 
p=0.417 
Fisher’s exact=0.327 
Education of the respondent 
1=V grade; 2=VIII grade; 3= 
high school; 4= Degree 
2.79 
(.68) 
2.73 
(.81) 
z=0.570 
p=0.567 
Fisher’s exact=0.154 
 
Job of the respondent 
1=yes, full time; 2=yes, part 
time; 3=no 
1.81 
(.82) 
1.86 
(.87) 
z=0.209 
p=0.834 
Fisher’s exact=0.707 
 
Education of the partner 
1=V grade; 2=VIII grade; 3= 
high school; 4= Degree 
2.75 
(.64) 
2.82 
(.81) 
z=0.426 
p=0.670 
Fisher’s exact=0.235 
 
Job of the partner 
1=yes, full time; 2=yes, part 
time; 3=no 
1.19 
(.49) 
1.24 
(.60) 
z=0.171 
p=0.864 
Fisher’s exact=0.628 
 
Who takes care of the child 
after school 
1=parents; 2=grandparents, 
3=other relatives, 4=baby-
sitter, 5=other 
1.19 
(.45) 
1.32 
(.74) 
z=0.570 
p=0.567 
Fisher's exact=1.000 
 
School performance 
reported by the parents 
1=well above the average; 2= 
above the average; 3= 
Males + Females 
2.64 
(.57) 
 
Males + Females  
2.96 
(.64) 
 
z=2.143 
p=0.032 
Fisher's exact=0.102 
 
 31 
average; 4=below the average; 
5=well below the average 
Males 
2.60 
(.64) 
 
Females 
2.72 
(.46) 
Males  
2.95 
(.49) 
 
Females  
2.96 
(.76) 
 
z=2.018 
p=0.044 
 
 
z=0.942 
p=0.346 
 
Having a weekly allowance 
1=yes; 0=no 
0.04 
(.20) 
0.05 
(.24) 
z=0.942 
p=0.346 
 
Use of the PC alone 
1=yes; 0=no 
0.32 
(.47) 
0.33 
(.48) 
z=0.142 
p=0.887 
 
Minutes at the PC per day 
 
47 
(17) 
 
56 
(51) 
z=0.110 
p=9125 
TV alone 
1=yes; 0=no 
0.60 
(.50) 
 
0.58 
(.50) 
z=0.110 
p=9125 
Minutes at the PC per day 
 
76 
(31) 
84 
(57) 
z=0.110 
p=9125 
Participation in individual 
activities 
1=yes; 0=no 
1.45 
(.50) 
1.42 
(.50) 
z=0.335 
p=0.738 
 
Participation in group 
activities 
1=yes; 0=no 
Males + Females  
0.76 
(.43) 
 
Males 
0.79 
(.42) 
 
Females 
0.72 
(.46) 
Males + Females  
0.41 
(.50) 
 
Males 
0.55 
(.51) 
 
Females 
0.30 
(.47) 
Males + Females  
z=3.461 
p=0.006 
 
z= 1.790 
p=0.074 
 
 
z=2.774 
p=0.006 
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